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21. Introduction 
Historically, fund managers and investors have considered emerging market equities as a separate asset class in 
making their portfolio allocation decisions. For example, an asset manager might be instructed to divide an 
institutional investor’s portfolio into 20% emerging market and 80% developed market securities. Within these 
broad divisions, the asset manager would usually be given discretion to allocate his or her portfolio among 
individual country and/or industry securities based on their risk, return and correlation characteristics. 
In recent years a number of economic, legal, accounting and financial developments have eroded the sources of 
separation between what had been thought of as “emerging” and “developed” country financial markets. For 
example, Henry (2000) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (1998) identify a whole spectrum of financial 
liberalization developments that have eased the flow of capital into and out of so-called emerging markets. These 
liberalizations include capital market reforms that have reduced the constraints and limits on foreign investors (such 
as those imposed on the proportion of shares a foreign investor might hold in domestic firms’equities), as well as the 
establishment of country funds.  
Many of the initial liberalizations took place in the mid to late 1980s and have continued into the 1990s, even as 
emerging markets experienced considerable return volatility during this period. Part of this return volatility has been 
attributed to internal conditions (e.g., Mexico, Russia, Indonesia, etc.) while part has been attributed to the greater 
openness of emerging market economies to external shocks (so-called contagion-effects). Developed country 
markets have not been immune from either incr as d volatility or contagion emanating from emerging markets. For 
example, US and UK financial market volatilities were significantly impacted by both the Asian and Russian crises 
of 1997 and 1998. 
This paper examines quantitative and qualitative evidence underlyi g the view that emerging 
market equities no longer represent a separate asset class and, relatedly, that world capital 
markets are becoming increasingly integrated. We find that empirical evidence strongly supports 
the view that the world’s financial markets are becoming increasingly integrated and that the 
integration process encompasses emerging markets. As a result, the idea of rigidly separating 
emerging market and developed market pools of investable funds (along with adopting separate 
3performance benchmarks) seems no longer appropriate. Indeed, recent moves by international 
investors to benchmark their portfolios to MSCI’s all-country world index (ACWI) and related 
world indexes – which include both emerging-market and developed market securitie  – seems a 
step in this direction.1 
In Section 2 of the paper, we assess the empirical evidence indicating greater integration among
the world’s capital markets. This first set of tests involves an analysis of the correlation 
structures among individual country equity markets during the 1988-1999 period. Particular 
attention is directed towards analyzing individual country (MSCI) stock return correlation 
structures and efficient frontiers over the 1988-93 period, compared with the more recent 1994-
1999 period. We also analyze the structure of the correlations among political risk indicators2 for
a similar group of countries over similar time periods.  
The second set of tests involves analyzing the ability of global economic fctors (after 
controlling for the effects of local economic factors) to explain the determination of monthly 
equity returns in emerging market countries during the 1988 to 1999 period and associated sub-
periods. A final set of tests examines correlations among country return volatilities (rather than 
return levels) as well as the proportion of individual emerging market stock return volatilities that 
can be attributed to global rather than local factors. 
In Section 3 we consider additional evidence supporting the notion of increased integration of 
emerging and developed country financial markets. This involves analyzing the growth in 
emerging market ADRs (and cross-border listings), the growth in foreign di ct investment (FDI) 
                                               
1 See, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Emerging Markets Investment Research, Global Emerging Markets Strategy, 
October 20, 1999. 
2 In this case, changes in monthly indexes produced by Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) – see Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996). 
4in emerging market countries, trends in international capital flows and the growth in cross-border 
merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions among developed and emerging market countries. 
Each of these developments is supportive of the view hat world capital markets are becoming 
more integrated. 
In Section 4, developments relating to accounting, legal and other potential barriers to emerging 
market investment are examined and their impact on the trend towards increased world financial 
market integration assessed.  
Section 5 presents a summary, and discusses the implications of the paper’s findings for 
international asset allocation and performance benchmarking. 
52. Quantitative Evidence Regarding Increased World Capital Market Integra io  
Table 1 shows the annualized returns and risks (standard deviations) for ten countries that were 
included at the inception of the MSCI-E F index3 in 1988, as well as countries that were 
included in the index later -- Korea (January 1992), Poland (April 1994), India (November 
1992), South Africa (April 1995) and Taiwan (January 1991).4  We also show the returns and 
risks on three commonly followed MSCI indexes: the Emerging Market (EM), the World 
(ACWI-free) and EAFE indexes.5 Also included are the annualized equity returns and risks over 
the 1988-1999 period for four developed markets -- th  US, Germany, the UK and Japan. The 
familiar pattern of higher emerging market returns (means) and high risks (standard deviations) 
compared to the (four) developed countries is clearly evident. 
However, while individual returns and risks are clearly important for international portfolio allocation, key 
additional ingredients are the correlations among country returns. In particular, if correlations mong emerging and 
developed market countries have increased with time, it would be consistent with the view that these countries’ 
equity markets are converging towards a single asset-class (reflecting the greater integration of world capital 
markets) and that fund managers have a declining ability to achieve “gross” diversification gains by subdividing 
asset portfolios and countries into an emerging market group and a developed-market grou .  
The (monthly) return correlation relationships are analyzed in two different ways: (i) based on local returns, and (ii) 
based on US dollar adjusted returns. In turn, these data are divided into two equal sub-periods to test the degree to 
which correlations among emerging and developed countries have increased.The chos n ub-periods are 1988-1993 
and 1994-1999. Since the 1997 Asian crisis may have had a distorting impact on returns and risks in the period 
immediately surrounding the crisis, the return correlations for the second sub-period (1994-1999) were also re-
estimated excluding the April 1997 to October 1997 period.  
                                               
3 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico (free) Philippines (free), Portugal and Thailand. 
4 The data sources are monthly returns collected by MSCI and JP Morg n. We analyze the 10 original EMF index 
countries plus Korea over the full 1988-1999 period. The returns for the other EMF countries are from their date of 
inclusion in the MSCI index until the end of 1999.
6Overall, whether using local returns, dollar returns and including or excluding the immediate Asian crisis months, 
these correlations essentially tell the same story. This can be seen in Table 2 Panel A. It shows the dollar-adjusted 
return correlations among emerging and developed countries in each of the two sub-periods analyzed, as well as 
correlation-by-correlation tests as to whether emerging market – developed country (i.e., US, UK, Japan,Germany 
and World) correlations increased over the 1994-1999 period compared to the 1988-1993 period. As is evident from 
the bottom of Table 2 (Panel A), most emerging market - developed country correlations increased and became 
more positive from the first to the second sub-period, with many of these correlations falling into the .2 to .4 range 
during the 1994-1999 period. The (Z-ratio) test as to whether a correlation increased to a statistically significant 
degree, is significant at the 10% confidence level (or above) in well over one-third of the cases. 
The effect of the increased correlations (integration) on the potential gains from simple country-by-country
diversification are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 compares the efficient mean-variance of retur s frontier, 
based on monthly country index returns, for the 1988-93 period with the efficient frontier for the 1994-99 period. 
Figure 2 shows the efficient frontier for the whole period 1988-1999.  From Figure 1 it can be seen that gains from 
simple country-by-country diversification were unambiguously lower in the 1994-99 period over all risk- eturn 
ranges except the very lowest. The flatter (less convex) frontier in the second sub-period (1994-99) reflects the more 
positive correlations among country returns reported in Table 2 (Panel A) above. This suggests that, increasingly, 
enhanced performance for asset managers will require strategies beyond simple asset allocations into country or 
regional baskets. Indeed, in the future such strategies will ne d to include increasing emphasis on industry and firm 
level analysis of emerging and developed country equity investments so as to best exploit informational and 
transaction cost advantages of asset managers.
While both economic and political factors are likely to impact the correlation structures shown in 
Table 2 (Panel A), it is also interesting to analyze the independent effects that political factors 
have had on return correlations. Indeed Mei (2000), among others, has found that political events 
have had significant effects on individual capital markets around the world. In Table 2 (Panel B), 
we use changes in Political Risk Guide’s monthly index of political risk -- the ICRG political 
                                                                                                                                               
5 EAFE stands for Europe, Africa and Far East. 
7risk assessment -- which rates countries on a scale of 1 to 100 (ahigh rating means less risky and 
a low rating more risky)6 to analyze political trends among emerging and developed market 
countries. As can be seen, while many political risk correlations are negative in both periods, 
there is a clear trend towards more positiv  (less negative) correlations in the most recent 1994-
99 sub-period.  
Further tests of significant differences between the two sub-p riod correlations of emerging 
market political risk rating changes and developed country political risk rating changes indicates 
that, in many cases, the trend towards more positive political rating correlations is statistically 
significant. This is shown at the bottom of Table 2 (Panel B) where over 80% of the political risk 
correlations of eleven emerging market countries with d veloped market countries show a 
significant increase for 1994-9 over 1988-93. Possible legal, accounting economic policy and 
regulatory effects underlying this increased integration are discussed in more detail in Section 4 
of this study. 
While the vidence seems to be clear that equity-return and political-risk rating correlations are 
increasing among countries, it is still not clear whether this means that global factors rather than 
local factors are more important in driving returns today than in the past. For example, 
international return correlations may still be highly dependent on correlations among local 
factors. In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the ability of a pre-s lected set of 
common factors to explain (predict) emerging market country returns -- see the references in 
Errunza, Hogan and Hung (1999), for example. In their paper, examining the 1976-93 period and 
                                               
6 These ratings are subjective and based on the following factors and weights: (i) Economic expectations versus 
reality (12%), (ii) Economic planning failures (12%), (iii) Political leadership (12%), (iv) External conflict (10%), 
(v) Corruption in government (6%), (vi) Military in Politics (6%), (vii) Organized Religion in Politics (6%), (viii) 
8seven developed and nine emerging market countries (when financial market liberalization was 
in its early stages in many emerging markets),7 the authors found that a US investor holding 
portfolios of US domestic stock, combined with ADRs , closed-end c untry funds and stocks of 
multi-national corporations could achieve many of the same return-risk characteristics of 
emerging market indexes without ever investing in non-US equities.  
Here we analyze the degree to which a pre-determined, common set of domestic (local) and global factors can 
explain emerging market returns, and whether there is a significant effect of global factors on emerging market 
returns over and above the effects of local factors.   
A summary of the results are presented in Table 3, where we show the degrees of fit (R2 ) of th  factor regressions 
and the F-test statistics, which indicate the degree to which global factors explain a given country’s returns over and 
above the effects of local factors.8  F  example, in the first sub-period (1988-93), local factors explained 9.3% of 
Brazilian returns (R2 =.093) while local plus global factors explained 28.2% of returns (R2 = .282)9.  The F test 
statistic (F=2.181) indicates that when global factors were added to local factors, it significantly enhanced the ability 
of investors to explain Brazilian equity returns through simple linear regression factor models. As is evident in Table 
3, in addition to Brazil, global factors added significantly to the explanatory power of local factors in the 
determination of stock returns in Greece, Jordan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand over the 1988-93 period.  
The second half of Table 3 shows the ability of local and global factors to explain returns during the most recent 
1994-1999 period. In 8 out of 10 cases the R2 of local plus global factors is higher in the second (1994-1999) sub-
period compared to the 1988-93 sub-period, with predictability (R2) lying in the 23% to 40% range -- which is quite 
high for monthly returns. Moreover, in 6 out of 10 cases, global factors added significant explanatory power (over 
                                                                                                                                               
Law and order tradition (6%), (ix) Political terrorism (6%), (x) Civil War (6%), (xi) Political party development 
(6%), (xii) Quality of the bureaucracy (6%). 
7 Errunza, Hogan and Hung (1999). 
8 The relevant local factors included in the regression (similar to those used by Bekaert and Harvey (1998) and 
Harvey (1995) )were all lagged one month. These factors were excess market return over the risk-fr e ate, market 
capitalization to GDP, balance of trade to GDP, inflation rate, percentage change in industrial production and where 
available short-term interst rates and the corporate bond index spread over treasuries. The relevant global factors 
(all lagged) included, excess return on the world market index, MSCI world index dividend yield, world inflation, 
percentage change in world industrial production, spread between the 10 year treasury yield and 3 month T.Bill 
9and above local factors) to the prediction of emerging market returns.  Table 3 also shows the factor regression 
results for selected countries that were added to the MSCI index at later dates.  In all but one case, global fact rs 
increased the explanatory power of the return equations, although these effects are not statistically significant due to 
the relatively short sample periods over which these return equations were estimated. 
Table 4 supplements the results of Table 3 by comparing the explanatory power of a model in 
which the coefficients (return sensitivities) of the local and global factors are constrained to 
being constant over the whole 1988-99 period compared to a model in which the coefficients on 
the factors are allowed to shift once over time -- i.e., in this case by allowing the 1994-99 period 
coefficients to take on different values compared to the 1988-93 period. 
For all 10 emerging market countries (and for 5 of them significantly so), allowing the regression 
coefficients to “shift once over time” improves the explanatory power of the factor-r turn model. 
Moreover, in two of the five cases in which allowing for a regime (and thus coefficient) shift in 
1994 did not significantly improve the fit of the model, when the regime shift was assumed to 
occur after a material capital market liberalization there was a significant effect on the 
explanatory power of the factor model. These two countries were Argentina (November 1989) 
and Brazil (May 1991).9   
Overall, the results are consistent with a time-varying but increasingly predictable relationship 
among local and global factors, on the one-hand, and emerging market returns on the other.   
In Table 5 we extend this analysis by examining the degree of response of emerging-market 
equity returns to global and local factors by using an econometric model of time-varying returns 
                                                                                                                                               
yield, the percentage change in the price of oil and the US bond spread (BBB 7-10 y r corporate bonds over 
maturity matched treasuries). 
9 The liberalization dates were obtained from Henry (2000). 
10
developed by Bekaert and Harvey (1997).10 This model not only allows returns to be 
continuously time-varying in their relationship to local and global factors, but also allows returns 
to be non- ormally distributed (in general, emerging market returns exhibit both skewness (“fat-
tails”) and kurtosis (“peakedness”). In particular, Bekaert and Harvey (1997) allow for the non-
normality of returns by modeling the time-vary ng volatility of returns using a GARCH 
process.11  Using this approach, we calculate both the average (conditional) correlations among 
emerging market returns and global returns over different time periods, as well as the proportion 
of the variance of local returns (on average) due to the variability of world factors -- ee the 
correlation and variance columns in Table 5.  A “conditional” correlation is like the relative 
effect of a shock in local factor loadings on local returns relative to the effect of a shock in global 
factor loadings on l cal returns.   
Table 5 provides the strongest evidence of increased capital market integration in the 1994-99 
period compared to the 1988-1993 period. In particular, for all countries except Jordan, the 
proportion of the (conditional) variance of local returns due to global factors is much higher in 
the most recent sub-period. A similar picture emerges if we look at (conditional) correlations. An 
extreme example is Argentina, where correlations were on average negative (-2.15%) in th
1988-93 period and became highly positive (55.41%) during 1994-1999. 
The evidence from Tables 1-5, confirming enhanced integration of emerging markets with 
developed country markets has some clear and important implications for fund managers. In 
                                               
10 One conceptual way to think of the met odologies in Tables 3,4 and 5 is as follows: in Table 3 we analyze local 
versus global factor effects on emerging market returns assuming that the sensitivities of local returns to these 
factors (the “b” coefficients) are stable over each period analyzed. In Table 4 we allow these sensitivities (or b’s) to 
shift once – either mid-way through the sample period or at the time of some liberalization event. Finally, in Table 5, 
the sensitivities (b’s) are allowed to vary continuously. 
11 GARCH stands for Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity—se  Engle (1982). 
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particular, simply allocating fu ds among indexes of different countries’ stocks (so-called 
macro-bets) will no longer be sufficient to generate diversification benefits. The best-performing 
managers in the future are likely to be those that possess superior information at the micro-level 
in emerging markets – for example, being able to identify undervalued firms in Jordan or 
Thailand and/or investigating potential industry trends in individual emerging market countries 
(e.g., in which emerging market countries will the “new-economy” businesses be most 
successful?). This suggests that it will be those fund managers with superior research teams at 
the emerging market firm and industry levels who will be in the best position to place informed 
micro-bets that beat target and competitor benchmarks. 
 
3. Economic Evidence of Enhanced Emerging Market-Dev loped 
Market Integration 
 
  In addition to statistical tests on returns and political risk ratings, it is possible to 
make a case that enhanced integration of emerging market and developed countries economies and 
capital markets has occurred using basic economic data. 
  Table 6 shows trade flows -- exports and imports -- between 
emerging market countries and OECD countries, both in dollar terms as well as a 
percent of emerging market country levels of GDP. As is apparent in the final 
column of Table 6, the proportion of emerging market exports to GDP increased 
by over 50% between 1985 and 1997, from 9% to 15%. 
  Table 7, and its annualized disaggregation Table 8, shows the scale -- bot  in 
number of transactions and in dollars -- of cross-border M&A activity among OECD and 
emerging market countries over the 1985-1999 period. Comparing 1985 - 1993 with 1994 -1999 in 
Table 8, the total number of cross border M&A deals and the dollar value of those deals in 1985-
12
93 were, respectively, 1,375 and $130,190 million. This compares to 4,218 and $455,872 million 
over the 1994-1999 period. Both numerically and in dollar value terms, the number of M&A deals 
tripled in the most recent six year sub-pe iod (1994-99) compared to the prior nine year sub-period 
(1985-1993), indicating an acceleration in the growth of multinational corporate linkages, 
especially those spanning both developed and emerging-mark t country borders. 
  It should also be noted that many of these cross-borde  linkages do not simply 
reflect partial or passive ownership stakes by developed country investors. Indeed, one of the 
outcomes of the Asian crisis, in both the real and financial sectors, is that foreign investors 
demand a more active corporate governance role than they were previously willing to accept. For 
example,  after the Asian crisis Korea raised its foreign ownership limits on telecom companies 
from 20% to 49% (with the exception of Korea Telecom). In 2001 Korea Telecom’s foreign 
ownership stake will be raised from 20% to 33% when it is to be listed on the stock market. Both 
Commerzbank and Newbridge (a US private equity firm) now play an active corporate governance 
role in respectively the Korea Exchange Bank and Korea First Bank, in which they took equity 
stakes in the post crisis period. A similar trend can be found in Thailand with ABN-AMRO’s 
purchase of the Bank of Asia and the Development Bank of Singapore’s acquisition of the Thai 
Danu bank. 
  Table 9 shows the growth in foreign direct investment flows from 
developed (OECD) to developing countries during 1985-1998. Despite recurring 
crises in emerging market countries over the 1994-1998 period it is evident that 
FDI grew from $48 billion in 1994 to $82 billion in 1998.  By comparison, over 
the whole 1985-93 period FDI amounted to $225 billion, or approximately $25 
billion a year. 
  As noted earlier, in their 1999 study Errunza, Hogan and Hung 
analyzed the ability of U.S. “home” investors to replicate the returns of emerging 
13
market countries by forming portfolios of domestically traded equities along with 
ADRs, country funds and multinational corporations’ stocks.  Specifically, they 
found that they could generate portfolios that were highly correlated with 
emerging market country returns over the 1976-1993 period. One component of 
these replicating portfolios were emerging- a ket company ADR’s. Since 1993, 
the number of ADR programs, and in particular the number of ADRs from 
emerging market countries, has continued to expand. For example, the Bank of 
New York (the principal sponsor of U.S. ADRs) reports the total number of ADR 
programs as 986 in 1993, increasing by over 45% to 1438 in 1999.  
Tables 10 and Table 11 show the number and value (capital raised) of emerging market ADRs 
(as well as their regional composition) over the 1985-19 9 period. The total number of emerging 
market ADRs was 199 in 1993, growing to 367 by the end of 1999 (an increase of over 50%), 
even in the face of the Asian crisis and the strict US GAAP accounting and other disclosure
requirements imposed by the SEC during this period  -- se  Section 4 below. In terms of capital 
raised, the average amount per year for 1985-1993 was $2.3 billion. This compares to $2.1 
billion for 1994-99. If the crisis years 1997-98 are excluded, the av rage capital raised per year 
post-1993 was $2.8 billion per year. 
Among the reasons for the growth in cross-border listings from emerging market countries are 
the empirical findings that: 
 
• Share prices react favorably to cross-border listings; 
 
• Trading volume increases on average, and in many cases domestic trading volume 
increases as well; 
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• Exposure to local factor risk is significantly reduced with only a small increase in global 
market risk and foreign exchange risk -- see Karolyi (1998); and
 
• Cross border listings help lower the cost of capital for firms in emerging markets, thereby 
further integrating these firms with the world economy (i.e., emerging market firms 
increasingly face cost of capital similar to that in developed countries – see Henry 
(2000)).  
 
Of course US ADR’s are only one component of emerging market cross-listings, a material 
number of cross-listings (such as GDR’s) have occurred on the London and other European 
exchanges. 
Finally,  Figure 3 shows net (monthly) portfolio capital flows into 10 emerging market countries 
grouped into a total category as well as Asian and non-Asian categories.  The effects of both the 
1994 Mexican Tequila and 1997-8 Asian and Russian crises are evident by the negative net 
capital flows into these countries around, and immediately following, these crisis events. 
Nevertheless, capital flows are very sensitive to underlying economic conditions. As can be seen 
from Figure 3, by the end of 1999 net capital flows were almost back to their pre-Asian crisis 
1996 levels. This, in part, reflects the dramatic recent spurt in economic growth rates of a 
number of the emerging Asian countries – such as Malaysia and Thailand. Indeed, the World 
Bank,12 projects that average growth rates for developing countries overall is likely to reach 4.6 
% in 2000 and reach the even higher level of 4.8% in 2001-2002. If this growth spurt continues 
(see, Section 4) the demand for net international capital  will continue to intensify among 
emerging market countries. 
                                               
12 The World Bank (2000). 
 
4. Other Factors Leading to Greater Integration Between Emerging and Developed 
Markets  
15
 
Historically, a major barrier to increased capital market integration has been the diverse accounting standards 
adopted by countries around the world. Accounting standard-diversity often forces investors into having to compare  
“apples with oranges,” and inhibits their ability to achieve the degree of informational transparency required to 
appropriately evaluate performance across firms (and equities) in different countries. Int restingly, the Asian crisis 
and the inadequacy of the accounting standards in a number of the countries most directly affected by the crisis has 
added a sense of urgency to the search for a degree of harmonization in accounting standards internationally.  
According to a number of observers -- see, for example, Choi (1999) -- the question is no longer whether we should 
have a set of high quality international accounting standards, but when and how this might be achieved. One 
important milestone has been the work of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which has 
completed a harmonized set of international accounting standards. The International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) is in the process of reviewing IASC’s proposed standards. If these standards pass IOSCO 
scrutiny, it is likely that IOSCO will recommend their use by all reporting entities for cross-bord r capital raising 
and listing purposes. A key player in the final endorsement will be the SEC, which is coming under considerable 
pressure from US exchanges such as the NYSE to view these standards as an adequate “substitute” for US GAAP in 
order to avoid driving-away potential and current international listings. 
A second historic barrier to capital market integation has been differences across countries in 
the legal codes and rules covering shareholder and creditor rights. In a recent paper LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) examined 49 different countries. Their results 
imply that English-origin  (common law) countries had the strongest investor protections, with 
French civil law countries offering the weakest. German and Scandinavian-civil-law countries 
fell somewhere in the middle. Importantly, one variable analyzed in explaining investor 
protection was the per capita GDP (income) of each of the 49 countries. In general, emerging 
market countries have relatively low per-capita GDP while developed countries have relatively 
high levels.  Specifically, the authors found that per-capita GDP was unrelated to shareholder 
rights as well as to debtholder rights across the 49 countries in their sample. Indeed, if anything, 
they found that creditor rights were stronger in poorer (low income) than in richer (higher 
16
income) countries, possibly due to the fact that poor countries need to adapt their laws to 
facilitate secured lending in the absence of the alternative sources of finance normally available 
in advanced countries. The authors also found no statistical link between the per capita income of 
a country and shareholder concentration. That is, on average, corporations in emerging market 
countries are no more concentrated in ownership than those in developed market countries.13 
It is also increasingly being recognized that emerging market countries have strong incentives to 
pursue policies in the future that deal with the remaining barriers facing foreign investors. Recent 
World Bank research14 suggests that development of local equity markets is strongly linked to an 
emerging market country’s economic growth process. In particular, the evidence suggeststhat: 
                                               
13 Although they did find the degree of legal enforcement to be worse in poorr (low-income) countries than high-
income countries. 
14 Levine, 1996.
 
 
(i) Countries that had more-liquid stock markets in 1976 tended to grow much 
faster than those which did not. 
 
(ii) Higher levels of stock market liquidity, measured by the turnover ratio (trading 
volume divided by market capitalization) tended to be associated with more rapid growth. 
These findings, in turn, suggest that net international portfolio capital flows play a critical role in the emerging-
market economic growth process (as discussed in Section 3). In particular, they can contribute disproportionately to 
market liquidity, especially in the presence of local mutual funds, which buy and sell in response to new client 
investments and redemptions. They can also force securities prices into line with those prevailing on global markets. 
Increased international portfolio flows, can also encourage an upgrading of the infrastructure underlying trading 
systems such as: clearance and settlement systems, payment systems, and custody services. And, can improve the 
process of corporate governance, serving as a bellwether for local portfolio investors, who may find encouragement 
from a significant foreign presence in the marketplace.  
17
Edwards (2000) examines the linkage between economic performance and capital mobility, notably whether higher 
capital mobility is associated with higher rates of economic growth – after controlling for other factors – and
whether this linkage is different for developed and emerging market countries. He concludes that there is a strong 
statistical link between capital- ccount openness and economic performance (growth and total factor productivity) 
but that this linkage only manifests itself after the country has reached a certain degree of development in its 
domestic financial market. Based on this evidence, there appears to be a “threshold” yond which integration 
between a developing country’s financial market and global financial markets clearly makes itself felt. 
In an exhaustive analysis of the empirical problems encountered in attempting to document international financial 
integration, Buch and Pierdzioch (2000) suggest that there is no single, comprehensive measure of the degree of 
international capital mobility. Nevertheless, they document a particularly sharp rise in capital flows in the second 
half of the 1990s and relate this toGDP growth, increased trade flows, deregulation of capital flows and the 
expanding size and sophistication of domestic financial systems. 
Hull and Tesar (2000) show that there is a direct link between the level of economic development and the level of 
financial intermediation and that when a country  e.g., an emerging market country, integrates into the global capital 
market, cross-border capital flows tend to be dominated by foreign direct investment and equity. 
Table 12 indicates the profile of long-term capital flows to developing countries from 1990 to 1999. Both direct and 
portfolio equity investment rose dramatically, although the latter fell back after the financial crises of 1997-98.  But, 
as Table 13 shows, the structure of capital flows to developing countries has shifted dramatically during the 1990s. 
While official capital flows and bank lending have declined portfolio flows and particularly foreign direct 
investment inflows have increased significantly. Within the realm of private-sector capital flows, the lower panel of 
Table 13 shows the dominance of foreign direct investment as a source of capital for developing countries during the 
1990s.  
Table 14 shows the similarities and differences in financial flows of developed and developing countries during two 
periods, 1988-92 and 1993-98, (the most recent data available). Foreign direct investment dominated, and equity 
investments increased from the first period to the second period while bank lending declined for both groups of 
countries. Thus, Table 14 suggests that there has been a strong degree of similarity in capital flow trends among 
developed and developing countries over the last decade or so.   
 The pursuit of global capital flows over recent years (such as shown in Table 14) 
also has encouraged emerging market countries (often with IMF and World Bank 
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encouragement) to pursue policies that provide an economic environment which holds 
out the prospect of good, long-term, risk-adjusted returns for international investors.  
 These reforms include the basics: strong macro and micro-economic policies that 
seek to transform the country’s economic system from what was commonly a centralized, 
socialistic, import-substituting, foreign aid-dependent system into what is becoming the 
“consensus” model of an open-market, low inflation, deregulated, private-sector oriented 
economy of the future. Many emerging market countries have already moved in this 
direction, notably several in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Privatization, the 
elimination of government subsidies and the removal of restrictions on foreign 
investment have all been powerful tools in accelerating this transition process.  
 Governments’ that want to attract international portfolio investment are 
increasingly clear about the importance of creating and maintaining the basic conditions 
for viable capital markets.15  Fundamental to this process is a functioning financial system 
that embraces a viable banking industry, insurance and securities industries and well as 
local pension and mutual funds. Banks in many emerging market countries have often 
been large, subsidized, bureaucratic institutions that possess few skills in finance and 
have driven customers to transact in parallel (or unofficial) markets. Many of these banks 
have been burdened with loans to non-performing state-owned enterprises or to large 
domestic corporate combines deemed "too big to fail." Increasingly a number of 
emerging market countries have taken drastic steps to separate this debt from the rest of 
the banking system by establishing separately managed "bad banks," as repositories for 
this debt, and establishing government sponsored bad loan corporations to absorb and 
workout this debt similar to the Resolution Trust Corpora ion that was established in the 
US to resolve Savings and Loan failures in the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
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 Indeed, the acceptance of the good-bad bank model and the RTC model in 
countries such as Thailand, Korea and Malaysia suggest a greater willingness in these 
countries to more flexibly adjust their economies and financial systems over the long-
term and to adopt successful features of western developed country responses to financial 
crises (of which both the good-bad bank model and RTC are good examples). 
 Some developing countries such as Thailand have also created new markets in 
government securities, as a competitive alternative for borrowers and depositors (partly in 
response to the effect of the Asian crisis on their budget deficits). Countries like Korea, 
the Philippines, Poland and Colombia have also established domestic commercial paper 
markets as well. 
 While few emerging market countries currently have the economic capacity or the 
political will to adopt far-re ching free-market policies (and the fre-market paradigm) 
all at once, gradual but steady approaches seem to be working for a number of countries. 
Successfully rebuilt emerging market countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Chile have all moved purposefully in that direction, but only at a pace that could be 
accommodated by accompanying political feasibility, infrastructure-building and 
propensity to withstand external shocks. Other countries, that have tried hard to accept 
the free-market paradigm (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and perh ps India), have had 
considerable success despite some disappointments. The most powerful point of the new 
paradigm, however, is that countries recognize the net economic benefits of positive 
international capital inflows. Thus, a consistent barometer of their efforts, flawed as it 
may be from time to time, is in the capital they are able to attract from international 
investors as they further integrate with the world economy.   
                                                                                                                                               
15 Walter, 1993. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has taken a wide-ranging look at the case for viewing emerging market countries equities as a similar 
asset class to developed countries equities. While a number of frictions and barriers still remain to full capital market 
integration, especially in the areas of legal enforcement and accounting standards, the underlying liberalization of 
emerging market capital markets, their increased openness to FDI, the growth of ADRs and similar cross listings, 
the growth of country funds as well as the surge of cross-border M&A transaction -- along with developments in 
information and other technologies -- have significantly enhanced the degree of integration and financial flows 
among the world’s capital markets. Indeed, a core contribution of this paper consists of correlation and factor tests 
that show the extent to which capital market integration has accelerated in recent years, both economically and 
politically. In sum, it is hard to argue today that the 10 to 15 largest emerging market countries should be viewed as 
a separate asset class from those countries considered to be developed. 
Indeed, as a result of the world’s capital markets becoming more integrated, portfolio managers and investors will 
have to increasingly refocus their portfolio decisions on micro-level rather than macro-level developments. Only 
those managers that can consistently identify under-performing firms and industries in individual emerging markets 
are likely to be able to consistently beat other portfolio managers and relevant benchmarks. 
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Table 1 : Summary Statistics
Annualised Coefficient ofExcess Bera - Jarque
Country Mean Std.Dev SkewnessKurtosis chi sq
ARGENTINA 0.260670.563940.707220.8299216.2486
BRAZIL 0.2175 0.65638 -1.3793 5.39802 222.02
CHILE 0.221430.26573 -0.5347 -0.5007 8.42313
MEXICO 0.251040.37698 -1.0001 -0.3786 25.0371
GREECE 0.19937 0.3619 1.10875 0.458 30.9759
JORDAN 0.002570.15971 -0.4348 -0.6834 7.38928
KOREA 0.05304 0.408 0.422680.668187.01489
MALAYSIA 0.085150.35807 -0.2025 -0.0853 1.03538
PHILIPPINES 0.086020.35462 -0.0818 -1.0244 6.50185
THAILAND 0.0499 0.43353 -0.4382 -1.0834 11.7321
PORTUGAL 0.054790.223310.35944 -1.3886 12.2254
POLAND 0.116570.42503 -0.4193 2.70127 1.9152
INDIA 0.0076 0.284430.25756 -0.5624 38.3292
SOUTH AFRICA 0.023630.30986 -1.3994 4.9887328.4893
TAIWAN 0.059520.33458 -0.2846 0.1787513.8055
EMERGING MARKETS 0.156710.24325 -1.186 1.1706 42.2692
World Free 0.098270.13887 -0.5869 -1.6945 25.6711
EAFE 0.063960.17136 -0.2737 -2.4196 37.182
US 0.147720.13163 -0.6748 -1.2411 20.31
GERMANY 0.125840.20276 -0.6026 -1.006 14.8898
UK 0.090620.162290.05652 -2.8562 49.366
JAPAN 0.009720.26684 0.0689 -2.3163 32.531
1st half 1988-93
*  ARGENTINA  *            -K*  BRAZIL *               -K* CHILE *                -K* MEXICO (FREE)  *        -K*  GR ECE *             -K* JORDAN *               -K* KOREA  *                -K*  MALAYSIA FREE  *          *  PHILIPPINES (FREE)  *   -K*  THAILAND FREE  *          * PORTUGAL *            -K* EMERGING MARKETS (FREE)-KWorld Free*    EAFE
*  ARGENTINA  *            -K1
*  BRAZIL  *               -K0.056592 1
*  CHILE  *                -K0.03435 0.151247 1
*  MEXICO (FREE)  *        -K0.263119 0.042786 0.081589 1
*  GREECE  *               -K0.163129 0.187125 -0.02821 -0.0544 1
*  JORDAN  *               -K-0.04359 0.05667 0.163514 -0.07022 -0.03169 1
*  KOREA  *                -K-0.07967 -0.079 -0.1005 0.219209 -0.16444 -0.06903 1
*  MALAYSIA FREE  *          -0.05866 0.105919 0.090675 0.25893 0.084772 0.078795 0.287188 1
*  PHILIPPINES (FREE)  *   -K0.104816 0.130132 0.115969 0.053993 0.241206 0.116982 0.09104 0.509557 1
*  THAILAND FREE  *          0.048288 0.01887 0.189048 0.282379 0.224316 0.14201 0.107764 0.613307 0.463433 1
*  PORTUGAL *              -K0.121448 0.216857 0.053401 -0.08793 0.500151 -0.19128 0.025725 0.277084 0.253198 0.186497 1
*   EMERGING MARKETS (FREE)-K0.19977 0.728094 0.301807 0.390413 0.319034 0.060756 0.136078 0.601182 0.420191 0.490122 0.364882 1
World Free -0.04601 0.216249 -0.03927 0.243001 0.176273 0.073808 0.333711 0.556577 0.329184 0.366556 0.476118 0.467325 1
*    EAFE  *               -M-0.1052 0.209611 -0.10338 0.158892 0.18834 0.037155 0.338052 0.509233 0.280336 0.303951 0.486377 0.413706 0.961044 1
US 0.167098 0.130242 0.142976 0.366546 0.052573 0.147415 0.157405 0.416948 0.301127 0.356736 0.222422 0.386513 0.639988 0.406177
GERMANY -0.07267 -0.05002 0.019958 0.165078 0.291088 -0.06397 0.041549 0.375251 0.263083 0.318072 0.350163 0.231565 0.595284 0.578084
UK -0.05013 0.086013 -0.02733 0.130641 0.152987 0.01667 0.313531 0.446777 0.191839 0.194372 0.413393 0.316996 0.780382 0.729146
JAPAN -0.18482 0.152538 -0.11131 0.04495 0.054973 0.150058 0.260912 0.387739 0.166606 0.210884 0.342603 0.248158 0.857836 0.905913
2nd half 1994-99
*  ARGENTINA  *            -K*  BRAZIL *               -K* CHILE *                -K* MEXICO (FREE)  *        -K*  GR ECE *             -K* JORDAN *               -K* KOREA  *                -K*  MALAYSIA FREE  *          *  PHILIPPINES (FREE)  *   -K*  THAILAND FREE  *          * PORTUGAL *            -K* EMERGING MARKETS (FREE)-KWorld Free*    EAFE
*  ARGENTINA  *            -K1
*  BRAZIL  *               -K0.597158 1
*  CHILE  *                -K0.615292 0.645323 1
*  MEXICO (FREE)  *        -K0.74577 0.6416 0.521534 1
*  GREECE  *               -K0.311882 0.261893 0.38772 0.290733 1
*  JORDAN  *               -K0.023939 0.122475 0.201602 0.141234 0.258933 1
*  KOREA  *                -K0.226578 0.188357 0.309285 0.198207 0.227709 0.132292 1
*  MALAYSIA FREE  *          0.3559 0.252382 0.47302 0.280127 0.253301 0.108207 0.334707 1
*  PHILIPPINES (FREE)  *   -K0.493251 0.381491 0.528407 0.412888 0.225992 0.009549 0.282391 0.672319 1
*  THAILAND FREE  *          0.464746 0.362721 0.445383 0.390815 0.188502 0.024133 0.599315 0.608456 0.717757 1
*  PORTUGAL *              -K0.260025 0.507853 0.298937 0.33345 0.650941 0.24585 0.109831 0.212048 0.295263 0.264854 1
*   EMERGING MARKETS (FREE)-K0.744008 0.751196 0.795423 0.763191 0.434852 0.172826 0.417242 0.662632 0.686573 0.683538 0.517029 1
World Free0.590846 0.504061 0.556106 0.571961 0.39439 0.202019 0.400502 0.456728 0.578521 0.570948 0.506904 0.721673 1
*    EAFE  *               -M0.514466 0.476669 0.509278 0.491306 0.369292 0.239869 0.451896 0.435152 0.51835 0.513146 0.483039 0.652346 0.929 1
US 0.566506 0.448346 0.501448 0.546221 0.344546 0.123088 0.278289 0.39655 0.548441 0.542168 0.383035 0.6673 0.902737 0.683004
GERMANY 0.255907 0.334161 0.284618 0.305253 0.392834 0.057146 0.11496 0.372776 0.457509 0.436025 0.492524 0.487133 0.697625 0.667402
UK 0.412784 0.36726 0.342711 0.403364 0.321014 0.212424 0.229032 0.332275 0.375888 0.377494 0.480353 0.484023 0.766994 0.770213
JAPAN 0.313401 0.306076 0.339005 0.28434 0.055923 0.24241 0.538672 0.218111 0.234397 0.354657 0.178925 0.387294 0.607734 0.759089
Table 2 Panel A: Correlations in returns
Table 2 Panel A (continued)
Tests for Significance in correlations difference in the 2 periods
test stat =Z (X1-X2)/(sqrt(1/(N1-3)+1/(N2-3))) 0.169642
US 2.792247 2.072846 2.400795 1.347266 1.807455 -0.14609 0.749235 -0.14409 1.800204 1.379851 1.045783 2.347089 4.295266 2.379704
GERMANY 1.971946 2.343565 1.607733 0.876549 0.680206 0.714821 0.435609 -0.01696 1.324782 0.812367 1.02426 1.747514 1.042481 0.863367
UK 2.883351 1.762683 2.266518 1.74643 1.052687 1.173275 -0.53812 -0.79746 1.184949 1.180462 0.493661 1.178489 -0.19666 0.553819
JAPAN 3.013909 0.957732 2.73955 1.458463 0.005616 0.566679 1.975905 -1.10505 0.41654 0.9235 -1.03846 0.914656 -3.41763 -3.00744
World 4.273763 1.974846 3.928693 2.372474 1.407989 0.77159 0.455359 -0.79397 1.876445 1.559105 0.23934 2.38434
1% critical value2.326342
5% critical value1.644853
10% critical value1.281551
Table 2 - Panel B : Correlations of political risk
Argentina Brazil Chile Greece Jordan Korea Malaysia Mexico Phillipines Portugal Thailand
Argentina 1
Brazil -0.16182 1
Chile 0.856883 -0.21318 1
Greece 0.51817 -0.26869 0.351889 1
Jordan 0.734959 -0.03648 0.6595 0.62026 1
Korea 0.815113 -0.09924 0.656019 0.503642 0.861073 1
Malaysia 0.883631 -0.22205 0.899821 0.447219 0.543644 0.627405 1
Mexico 0.741845 -0.21545 0.817453 0.25047 0.385745 0.496279 0.854453 1
Phillipines 0.622302 -0.20972 0.497609 0.678137 0.869311 0.753403 0.398654 0.215383 1
Portugal -0.17533 0.340268 -0.41521 0.265993 0.262991 0.083849 -0.46204 -0.52546 0.333587 1
Thailand 0.42907 0.063485 0.416419 0.266002 0.643499 0.466769 0.196917 0.164707 0.705749 0.324213 1
US -0.58077 0.155248 -0.50905 -0.67141 -0.64058 -0.64758 -0.61308 -0.36569 -0.45678 0.050738 -0.00626
UK -0.63625 0.304486 -0.74172 -0.0388 -0.20899 -0.4054 -0.76917 -0.68029 -0.16004 0.711713 -0.10223
Japan -0.88933 0.134216 -0.82533 -0.35762 -0.61143 -0.74383 -0.85787 -0.77997 -0.44174 0.370808 -0.18764
Argentina Brazil Chile Greece Jordan Korea Malaysia Mexico Phillipines Portugal Thailand
Argentina 1
Brazil -0.5733 1
Chile -0.57275 0.530477 1
Greece -0.45585 0.525132 0.908401 1
Jordan 0.066976 0.052111 -0.15532 0.061646 1
Korea -0.04626 0.132068 0.278244 0.254649 -0.22024 1
Malaysia -0.52496 0.53126 0.873081 0.904803 -0.05279 0.22557 1
Mexico 0.384152 -0.03388 -0.60049 -0.65138 -0.19111 -0.03424 -0.64267 1
Phillipines -0.71999 0.815266 0.655072 0.54331 -0.22563 0.050195 0.602631 -0.14225 1
Portugal -0.38113 0.526824 0.878388 0.868004 -0.23808 0.326921 0.879266 -0.56851 0.580604 1
Thailand -0.42941 0.481215 0.853326 0.769808 -0.37827 0.384106 0.853259 -0.41314 0.619384 0.900646 1
US -0.45882 0.345962 0.731075 0.553398 -0.6327 0.272639 0.567165 -0.25993 0.654168 0.69583 0.746903
UK -0.50406 0.714771 0.761278 0.643099 -0.42007 0.246685 0.740331 -0.19978 0.816799 0.793804 0.840087
Japan -0.59867 0.653252 0.877491 0.846516 -0.12752 0.223537 0.871661 -0.50295 0.698646 0.855458 0.817397
Table 2 - Panel B : Correlations of political risk
Significant differences in correlations of political risk
Argentina Brazil Chile Greece Jordan Korea Malaysia Mexico Phillipines Portugal Thailand
US 0.618437 0.967171 6.289047 6.211362 0.039998 4.66672 5.985414 0.536305 5.633982 3.271462 3.819535
UK 0.670365 2.080681 7.622144 3.458106 -1.07044 3.306913 7.65515 2.436786 4.953877 0.416309 4.778802
Japan 1.474004 2.632195 8.63555 6.106526 2.454047 4.90584 8.770965 1.404865 5.783241 2.457811 5.096859
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Results of F tests
Period1 1988-1993 Period2 1994-1999
R2 local R2 local+global F prob R2 local R2 local+global F prob
Argentina 0.099 0.204 1.112 0.368 0.181 0.237 0.584 0.766
Brazil 0.093 0.282 2.181 0.049 0.219 0.299 0.928 0.492
Chile 0.125 0.287 1.817 0.102 0.016 0.250 2.549 0.024
Mexico 0.114 0.250 1.451 0.204 0.191 0.249 0.621 0.737
Greece 0.139 0.393 3.349 0.005 0.122 0.288 1.906 0.085
Jordan 0.078 0.243 1.837 0.097 0.142 0.322 2.197 0.048
Korea 0.050 0.118 0.638 0.723 0.294 0.401 1.481 0.192
Malaysia 0.059 0.251 2.119 0.056 0.257 0.398 1.905 0.086
Phillipines 0.188 0.266 0.848 0.553 0.143 0.409 3.666 0.003
Thailand 0.198 0.442 3.502 0.004 0.059 0.352 3.684 0.002
Countries with insufficient data for split estimation
R2 local R2 local+global F prob period of estimation
India 0.10 0.28 1.75 0.11 Feb 94 - Dec 99
Poland 0.12 0.20 0.59 0.75 Mar 95 - Dec 99
South Africa 0.27 0.37 0.48 0.85 Mar 95 - Dec 99
Taiwan 0.28 0.48 1.39 0.25 Sep 96 - Dec 99
Latin 0.08 0.16 0.74 0.63 Feb 94 - Dec 99
Asia 0.29 0.22 0.84 0.56 Feb 94 - Dec 99
Local factors :(all lagged) : excess market return,market capitalisation to gdp,trade to gdp
inflation, change in industrial production,and where available short term interest rate
and bond index spread over US treasuries
Global factors :(all lagged) : excess world index return,MSCI world index dividend yield,
world inflation, change in world industrial production,difference between 10 year bond yield
and 3 month US T bill,change in priceof oil, US  bond spread (BBB 7-10 year corporate
bonds over US treasury)
Table 3 - Effect of world factors in subperiods
Results of F tests Do world factors change over time?t st for differences in coeff
Constant world factors different world factors on global factors
R2 local+global R2 local+global F Prob
Argentina 0.124 0.203 1.516 0.158
Brazil 0.159 0.209 0.960 0.471
Chile 0.136 0.217 1.550 0.147
Mexico 0.116 0.149 0.586 0.788
Greece 0.276 0.337 1.387 0.209
Jordan 0.157 0.259 2.079 0.043
Korea 0.159 0.305 3.172 0.003
Malaysia 0.158 0.305 3.174 0.003
Phillipines 0.147 0.297 3.202 0.003
Thailand 0.171 0.343 3.941 0.000
Countries with sufficient data around liberalization dates test for differences in coeff
Liberalization date used R2 local+global on global factors
(chaging global factors) F Prob
Argentina Nov-89 0.24 2.33 0.02
Brazil May-91 0.25 1.87 0.07
Chile Jan-92 0.15 0.31 0.95
Korea Jan-92 0.28 2.49 0.02
Local factors :(all lagged) : excess market return,market capitalisation to gdp,trade to gdp
inflation, change in industrial production,and where available short term interest rate
and bond index spread over US treasuries
Global factors :(all lagged) : excess world index return,MSCI world index dividend yield,
world inflation, change in world industrial production,difference between 10 year bond yield
and 3 month US T bill,change in priceof oil, US  bond spread (BBB 7-10 year corporate
bonds over US treasury)
Table 4 - Effect of changing world factors
Average Conditional World Market Correlation and Proportion of Variance due to world factors
1988-1999 Correlation%  Variance 1988-1993Correlation%  Variance 1994-1999 Correlation%  Variance
Argentina 27.22% 17.46% -2.15% 1.76% 55.41% 32.46%
Brazil 30.51% 11.49% 19.03% 4.33% 41.83% 18.55%
Chile 29.31% 11.53% 18.06% 6.08% 40.41% 16.90%
Mexico 38.47% 18.00% 23.84% 6.64% 52.91% 29.20%
Greece 19.84% 4.44% 17.84% 3.67% 21.81% 5.20%
Jordan 12.29% 3.66% 11.78% 4.38% 12.80% 2.94%
Korea 35.20% 12.79% 33.44% 11.42% 36.93% 14.15%
Malaysia 53.08% 29.57% 51.48% 27.93% 54.65% 31.19%
Phillipines 38.52% 17.73% 27.58% 7.94% 49.30% 27.39%
Thailand 41.67% 20.62% 33.39% 15.08% 49.84% 26.09%
Countries with insufficient data for split estimation
India 32.33% 11.62%
Poland 40.01% 21.73%
South Africa 54.05% 29.97%
Taiwan 55.85% 34.02%
Latin 36.94% 21.71%
Asia 60.43% 37.35%
Table 5 -Surprise in local shock explained by world shock
TABLE 6
(Millions of US $)
Year EM exports to OECD (I) EM imports from OECD (II) (I)+(II) EM GDP (III) (I)/(III) ((I)+(II))/(III)
1985 289,012.12 223,420.11 512,432.233,197,660.00 0.09 0.16
1986 287,770.19 244,095.29 531,865.483,351,160.00 0.09 0.16
1987 344,445.45 283,767.31 628,212.763,517,600.00 0.10 0.18
1988 397,967.73 344,618.98 742,586.713,693,070.00 0.11 0.20
1989 437,968.28 370,654.67 808,622.953,825,490.00 0.11 0.21
1990 481,963.53 413,356.48 895,320.013,977,230.00 0.12 0.23
1991 512,332.90 464,102.70 976,435.604,161,720.00 0.12 0.23
1992 546,902.00 524,419.001,071,321.004,379,460.00 0.12 0.24
1993 557,384.00 569,819.001,127,203.004,641,980.00 0.12 0.24
1994 651,530.00 653,829.001,305,359.004,965,610.00 0.13 0.26
1995 775,963.00 792,179.001,568,142.005,219,400.00 0.15 0.30
1996 842,482.00 814,116.001,656,598.005,537,840.00 0.15 0.30
1997 899,526.00 846,824.001,746,350.006,096,470.00 0.15 0.29
1998 905,257.40 752,278.801,657,536.20
Data Sources: 
(1) IMF -- Direction of Trade Statistics
(2)  International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1999.  IMF.
(3) Human Development Report, Oxford University Press.
TABLE  7
Value of Completed International Merger and Corporate Transactions
OECD* with Emerging Markets
1985-1999
(Number of deals and millions of US dollars)
OECD Buyer OECD Seller  Total Activity Btn OECD and EM
Emerging Market # $M # $M # $M
Latin America 1,057 160,533.0 100 11,855.8 1,157 172,388.8
(1,283) ** (91) (1,374)
Africa 424 28,003.9 305 36,450.8 729 64,454.7
(437) (185) (622)
Asia (excl. Japan) 2,472 255,086.9 1,227 93,919.4 3,699 349,006.3
(2,728) (696) (3,424)
Totals 3,953 443,624 1,632 142,226 5,585 585,850
(4,448) (972) (5,420)
                    TABLE 8
Value of Completed International Merger and Corporate Transactions
OECD* with Emerging Markets
1985-1999
(Number of deals and millions of US dollars)
Year # $M # $M # $M # $M # $M # $M # $m # $m # $m
1985 3 1,174 1 41 1 37 1 9 10 1,235 7 62 14 2,445 9 112 23 2,557
(4) ** (2) 0 (3) (9) (7) (13) (12) (25)
1986 1 23 1 290 4 561 1 36 14 977 18 1,523 19 1,561 20 1,848 39 3,409
(6) 0 (1) (2) (16) (5) (23) (7) (30)
1987 4 216 0 0 2 13 6 632 9 320 23 2,850 15 549 29 3,482 44 4,031
(10) (3) (2) (2) (26) (12) (38) (17) (55)
1988 15 1,421 2 10 4 145 2 292 32 3,009 30 2,430 51 4,575 34 2,731 85 7,306
(22) 0 (4) (2) (48) (10) (74) (12) (86)
1989 18 917 7 1,071 11 4,510 8 265 50 6,622 56 3,865 79 12,048 71 5,201 150 17,249
(26) (6) (4) (5) (54) (37) (84) (48) (132)
1990 31 9,738 2 335 4 471 13 2,378 83 16,438 66 5,023 118 26,648 81 7,736 199 34,384
(25) (5) (9) (6) (70) (28) (104) (39) (143)
1991 31 3,093 9 486 12 174 13 1,236 90 4,814 69 3,432 133 8,081 91 5,153 224 13,234
(48) (4) (33) (12) (135) (49) (216) (65) (281)
1992 40 3,527 8 913 16 531 23 2,334 96 6,406 79 4,414 152 10,464 110 7,661 262 18,125
(57) (9) (22) (9) (114) (43) (193) (61) (254)
1993 55 4,195 12 1,239 22 1,697 18 2,413 132 8,129 110 12,223 209 14,020 140 15,875 349 29,895
(89) (4) (22) (22) (164) (68) (275) (94) (369)
1994 80 6,681 11 655 35 627 25 3,022 207 9,195 158 6,051 322 16,504 194 9,728 516 26,232
(104) (12) (36) (14) (217) (74) (357) (100) (457)
1995 107 6,754 7 2,071 56 1,577 22 2,908 251 12,163 131 8,787 414 20,493 160 13,766 574 34,259
(143) (5) (59) (13) (319) (64) (521) (82) (603)
1996 141 13,655 10 893 71 2,056 27 2,202 323 22,015 136 8,271 535 37,726 173 11,366 708 49,092
(145) (6) (81) (16) (366) (87) (592) (109) (701)
1997 185 26,406 9 1,700 60 5,729 39 4,350 363 41,981 135 10,231 608 74,116 183 16,281 791 90,397
(165) (7) (40) (27) (321) (70) (526) (104) (630)
1998 195 46,308 13 381 55 4,462 57 7,618 418 65,142 115 13,901 668 115,911 185 21,900 853 137,811
(231) (15) (54) (17) (424) (62) (709) (94) (803)
1999 152 36,429 8 1,772 71 5,415 52 6,856 397 56,654 96 10,956 620 98,497 156 19,584 776 118,081
(207) (13) (70) (35) (445) (80) (722) (128) (850)
Totals 1,058 160,535 100 11,856 424 28,004 307 36,550 2,475 255,099 1,229 94,018 3,957 443,638 1,636 142,424 5,593 586,062
(1,282) (91) (437) (185) (2,728) (696) (4,447) (972) (5,419)
Source: Securities Data Company.
* Excluding Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, and Poland
*'* Numbers in brackets denote additional deals for which no values were available.
Asia (excl. Japan)
OECD Buyer OECD SellerOECD Buyer OECD Seller
Latin America Africa
OECD SellerOECD Buyer OECD Buyer OECD Seller Total
Total OECD with EM
TABLE 9 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment Flows from Developed to Developing Countries 
1985-1998 ($ million)1 
 
 
 
 Year   FDI   Bank Lending 
 
 1985     6,351.27   
 
1986 10,754.66 
 
1987 19,565.56 
 
1988 21,869.96 
 
1989 26,708.21 
 
1990 26,859.12 
 
1991 23,169.08 
 
1992 27,809.09 
 
1993 38,436.36 
 
1994 48,500.54 
 
1995 52,462.55  30,605.71 
 
1996 59,646.01  40,761.11 
 
1997 80,613.28  34,402.08 
 
1998 82,601.98  10,511.82 
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
 
 1Source: OECD development Assistance Committee, 1999. Developed countries are defined as members of 
the OECD Development Assistance committee. Developing countries defined per DAC criteria, not including the 
transition economies. 
TABLE 10 
 
 
Value of ADRs 
Issuers from Emerging Markets 
1985-1999 
(Number of deals and millions of US dollars) 
 
 
Emerging Market   
       #          $M 
Latin America 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
Asia (excl. Japan) 
 
 
    149 
 
 
        9 
 
 
    209   
     13,000.5 
 
 
         520.0    
 
 
     18,564.0 
 
Totals 
 
 
 
    367 
 
     32,085 
 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
TABLE 11
Value of ADRs 
Issuers from Emerging Markets
1985-1999
(Number of deals and millions of US dollars)
Year # $M # $M # $M # $m
1985 1 16 0 0 1 16 2 32
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1987 0 0 1 30 1 30 2 59
1988 0 0 0 0 1 105 1 105
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1990 2 89 0 0 3 143 5 232
1991 24 3,161 2 54 27 3,249 53 6,464
1992 26 3,220 0 0 30 3,466 56 6,686
1993 36 3,351 2 166 41 3,713 79 7,230
1994 55 3,001 2 78 81 5,766 138 8,845
1995 2 66 2 192 16 1,308 20 1,566
1996 0 0 0 0 1 20 1 20
1997 2 13 0 0 2 13 4 27
1998 1 84 0 0 4 434 5 518
1999 0 0 0 0 1 300 1 300
Totals 149 13,001 9 520 209 18,564 367 32,085
Source: Securities Data Company.
* Excluding Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, and Poland
*'* Numbers in brackets denote additional deals for which no values were available.
Total EMLatin America Africa Asia (excl. Japan)
Table 12: Net long-term flows to developing countries
($US billion)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Direct Investment 24.1 35.3 47.5 66.0 88.8 105.0130.8 170.3 170.9192.0
Portfolio investment 4.0 18.5 25.2 87.6 73.4 66.9 111.6 79.1 53.5 52.6
    Equity 2.8 7.6 14.1 51.0 35.2 36.1 49.2 30.2 15.6 27.6
    Bonds 1.2 10.9 11.1 36.6 38.2 30.8 62.4 48.9 37.9 25.0
of which public borrowing: 7.9 2.5 17.5 15.6 12.8 27.9 19.2 27.7
Bank lending and other debt 14.5 7.8 27.1 12.2 12.3 31.4 39.7 54.6 41.5 -5.9
of which public borrowing: 0.6 13.7 8.7 7.5 9.8 11.6 14.7 21.9
Official Flows 55.9 62.3 54.0 53.4 45.9 53.9 31.0 39.9 50.6 52.0
of which public borrowing: 27.2 23.5 25.0 13.1 21.1 3.3 13.3 24.9
Total 98.5 123.9 153.8 219.2220.4 257.2313.1 343.9 316.5290.7
Source: Leslie Hull and Linda L. Tesar, "The Structure of International Capital Flow,"
Paper presented at a conference on The World's New Financial Landscape, Kiel Institute of World Economics, June 19-20, 2000
Table 13: Developing Countries: Shares of total net inflows
   Average:
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 90-93 94-99
Direct investment 24.5 28.5 30.9 30.1 40.3 40.8 41.8 49.5 54.0 66.0 28.5 48.7
Portfolio investment 4.1 14.9 16.4 40.0 33.3 26.0 35.6 23.0 16.9 18.1 18.8 25.5
    Equity 2.8 6.1 9.2 23.2 16.0 14.0 15.7 8.8 4.9 9.5 10.4 11.5
    Bonds 1.2 8.8 7.2 16.7 17.3 12.0 19.9 14.2 12.0 8.6 8.5 14.0
Bank lending and other debt 14.7 6.3 17.6 5.6 5.6 12.2 12.7 15.9 13.1 -2.0 11.1 9.6
Official Flows 56.8 50.3 35.1 24.4 20.8 21.0 9.9 11.6 16.0 17.9 41.6 16.2
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 90-92 93-98
    Shares of private inflows
Direct investment 56.6 57.3 47.6 39.8 50.9 51.6 46.4 56.0 64.3 80.4 53.8 51.5
Portfolio investment 9.4 30.0 25.3 52.8 42.1 32.9 39.6 26.0 20.1 22.0 21.6 35.6
    Equity 6.6 12.3 14.1 30.8 20.2 17.8 17.4 9.9 5.9 11.6 11.0 17.0
   Bonds 2.8 17.7 11.1 22.1 21.9 15.2 22.1 16.1 14.3 10.5 10.5 18.6
Bank lending and other debt 34.0 12.7 27.2 7.4 7.0 15.4 14.1 18.0 15.6 -2.5 24.6 12.9
Source: Leslie Hull and Linda L. Tesar, "The Structure of International Capital Flow,"
Paper presented at a conference on The World's New Financial Landscape, Kiel Institute of World Economics, June 19-20, 2000
